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MARC – Mergers & Acquisitions Research Centre 
MARC is the Mergers and Acquisitions Research Centre at Cass Business School, City, 
University of London – the first research centre at a major business school to pursue focussed 
leading-edge research into the global mergers and acquisitions industry. 
MARC blends the expertise of M&A accountants, bankers, lawyers, consultants and other key 
market participants with the academic excellence of Cass to provide fresh insights into the 
world of deal-making. 
Corporations, regulators, professional services firms, exchanges and universities use MARC 
for swift access to research and practical ideas. From deal origination to closing, from financing 
to integration, from the hottest emerging markets to the board rooms of the biggest 
corporations, MARC researches the wide spectrum of mergers, acquisitions and corporate 
restructurings. 
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Overview
ne of the most notable features of 
acquisitions is the way managers, 
employees, and even other 
stakeholders closely observe to see who 
turns out to be on the top team. This attention 
signifies much more than curiosity in the 
human drama that’s unfolding. The 
appointments send strong signals about the 
new company’s direction and, more 
fundamentally, about how committed it is to 
its proclaimed strategy. Acquisitions require 
leadership from the top as that is arguably the 
most effective way to initiate change 
throughout an organisation. And it is not just 
in the final phases that leadership matters, it 
is crucial in other aspects of the deal such as 
negotiation. 
With this report we explore the value of top 
management, specifically CEOs, in a novel 
setting as we examine the role of the target 
company’s CEO in diversifying acquisitions. 
In a world where industries are constantly 
changing, firms may increasingly try to 
capture growth in a different industry than 
their own. One of the most challenging 
decisions for a company is whether to 
diversify in an unrelated industry. Such a 
strategy can lead to superior rewards but can 
also entail high risks. CEO industry expertise 
can be an important asset in connecting the 
two different worlds. Indeed, the fact that 
most of the M&A literature highlights the poor 
performance of unrelated acquisitions leads 
us to think that it is the absence of industry-
specific experience and knowledge that is 
driving these results. Therefore, this report 
sets to explore whether the industry-specific 
skills and knowledge held by the target firm’s 
CEO can impact acquisition success. 
Our focus is on deals where the retained 
CEOs from the target firms have work 
experience in the industry of the acquirer as 
these cases have received the least attention 
from prior studies. We examine the impact of 
these CEO’s on M&A negotiation, integration 
and value-generation.  
What we find and what it means 
CEOs from the target with industry 
experience are able to capture more value 
through harder bargaining and revised offer 
premiums. Retaining these CEOs post-
acquisition is associated with an average of 
8.05% higher premiums and 1.74% higher 
bid revisions. 
Industry experience also has a positive effect 
on the long-term operating performance of 
the combined firm. Retaining experienced 
CEOs can lead to 3.8% higher operating 
performance on average. In our view, better 
operating performance means more 
successful post-acquisition integration. 
CEOs with experience in the industries of 
both the acquirer and the target have a much 
more intricate understanding of the 
differences between the two industries, 
particularly when these are unrelated. Such 
understanding is crucial in negotiating better 
terms for shareholders as well as developing 
a successful integration strategy. We 
recommend that: 
 When making a bid, realise that you may 
have to pay more or up the bid to get a 
manager with rare cross-sector skills: 
scarcity has a value. 
 Once you have announced the deal, be 
ready to make clear who’s staying on 
post-deal. Our results show the market 
will often react negatively if the target 
has a CEO who is so experienced he 
may well choose to leave.  
 In the integration phase, if you have kept 
them on board, you now have an asset 
who talks the same language as you but 
can also translate the language of his or 
her sector. Our analysis shows that this 
can provide real operational synergies. 
The industry experience can be used by 
acquirers to prevent culture clashes and, 
more broadly, any kind of tension that 
could arise between the acquiring firm’s 
employees and the retained target staff. 
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What we know 
t the heart of this study are three 
different but closely related areas of 
research: 1) the role of CEOs in the 
M&A process, 2) industry-relatedness and M&A 
and 3) the role of knowledge and experience in 
the M&A process. We discuss each of these 
areas below.  
The role of CEOs  
The majority of past studies of the role of CEOs 
in the acquisition process have focused on the 
intrinsic conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and managers. These studies 
typically conclude that CEOs’ drive to fulfil their 
personal goals leads them to perform value 
destroying acquisitions.1 
Acquisitions can be preferred to organic growth 
since they present a quicker route to increasing 
the size of the firm. And given that firm size is a 
good predictor of a CEO’s compensation, it is 
not surprising that managers can be tempted to 
build their own empires in order to beef up their 
compensation packages. Additionally, studies 
show that CEOs are more likely to announce an 
acquisition when they anticipate a high post-
acquisition compensation and when 
competition is fierce, CEOs preserve their 
control with size-enhancing acquisitions to 
lower the probability of becoming a target.2  
Personal CEO traits can also exert a negative 
effect on how successful acquisition strategies 
can be. Hubris refers to the overconfidence of 
managers which can lead them to 
underestimate the risks associated with an 
acquisition, and overestimate their ability to 
realise synergistic gains. Studies have 
demonstrated a direct link between CEO 
narcissism and the speed of the negotiation 
process and the probability of deal completion.3 
                                                          
1  As an example see Harford, J. and Li, K., Journal of 
Finance, 2007. 
2 See Yim, S., Journal of Financial Economics, 2013 and 
Gorton, G., Kahl, M., and Rosen, R., Federal Reserve Bank 
of Chicago Working Paper Series, 2006.  
Company-relatedness and acquisitions 
The effect of diversification in unrelated 
industries has been the subject of study by M&A 
scholars for decades. Studies highlight the 
importance of relatedness between the acquirer 
and the target as it allows for the 
complementarity of resources, which can 
contribute to integration success. 4  Similarity 
between the target and the bidder can lead to 
higher value creation since the resources of the 
two businesses can be combined more easily. 
Studies also show that similarity between the 
two firms can benefit the integration process. 
The majority of the M&A literature highlights the 
inferior performance of unrelated mergers 
compared to related ones. Studies also 
highlight the importance of the organisational fit 
between the target and the bidder.5  
However, there may also be company-specific 
factors that can come into play in the integration 
phase such as organisational culture, 
resources and knowledge. For example, 
corporate culture can constitute an important 
impediment to the successful integration of 
firms. The majority of studies in this area 
suggest that organisational culture exerts a 
negative effect on the integration process.6 In 
particular, cultural attributes such as 
managerial styles can have a harmful effect on 
knowledge transfer between the two firms and 
therefore limit their absorptive capacity. Not 
surprisingly, the evidence suggest that 
similarity in the organisational culture between 
the target and the acquirer can facilitate the 
integration process. Similarity in management 
styles can also be a key success factor for the 
realisation of synergies. Some studies suggest 
that stress and frictions can arise when the 
norms and values of the two firms differ 
substantially.7  
3  Malmendier U., and Tate, G., Journal of Financial 
Economics, 2008. 
4 Larsson, R. and Finkelstein, S., Management Science, 
1999. 
5 See Datta, D., Strategic Management Journal, 1991. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Yildiz, H., Journal of Corporate Finance, 2014. 
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While there is an abundance of studies which 
demonstrate that a higher degree of 
relatedness between the acquiring firm and the 
target is positively associated with merger 
performance, some studies suggest the 
opposite.8 
The role of knowledge and experience 
Research has focused on different types of 
experience to determine acquisition 
performance. One type of experience is the 
experience of performing acquisitions. Many 
studies use the framework of organisational 
learning to show that past M&A experience is a 
predictor of superior performance. Specifically, 
studies in the area suggest that experienced 
acquirers are better at getting the timing of 
acquisitions right. Experienced acquirers are 
also better at using the support of external 
resources such as legal and financial advisors. 
Finally, experienced acquirers are more 
effective at integrating their targets and learning 
from their past acquisitions.9  
One study in this area makes an important 
contribution by drawing on the field of 
psychology. The authors argue that acquisition 
performance initially drops with experience as 
no two acquisition are exactly the same, but this 
trend later shifts to a superior ability to 
differentiate acquisitions and effectively 
applying general concepts. 10 
Conversely, another body of research finds a U-
shaped relationship between acquisition 
experience and performance. In addition to 
superior acquisition performance, acquisition 
experience can lead to improvements in 
negotiation outcomes. Specifically, negotiation 
performance improves with experience since 
the learning from one negotiation are 
transferable to another.11 
The integration phase of acquisitions is often 
viewed as one of the most challenging areas of 
the M&A process. Some studies show that the 
                                                          
8 Finkelstein, S. and Habelian, J., Organization Science, 
2002. 
9 Bauer, F., Matzler, K. and Wolf, S., International Business 
Review, 2016. 
10 Haleblian, J. and Finkelstein, S., Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 1999. 
11 Thomson, N., Strategic Management Journal, 1990. 
retention of qualified management drives higher 
merger performance, while others suggest that 
acquirers do not benefit from the retention of the 
target CEO neither in terms of merger 
announcement returns nor long-term operating 
performance.12 On the acquiring side, the CEO 
and its management are responsible for 
creating an atmosphere that facilitates 
knowledge transfer, collaboration and learning. 
Studies have found that an environment that 
supports knowledge transfer between the 
acquirer and the target is critical to M&A 
success. 13  Knowledge transfer is a gradual 
process within the organisation. Top 
management can be central to the successful 
transmission of knowledge which is an 
essential part of organisational success. 
Overlooking the importance of knowledge 
transfer is frequently pointed out as one of the 
main reason for M&A failure. Therefore, the 
CEO and its management team are crucial in 
laying out the preconditions for a successful 
merger integration.14
12 Fich, E., Officer, M., and Nguyen, T., Working Paper, 
2016. 
13 Lee, S.-J., Kim, J. and Park, B.I., Management Journal, 
2015. 
14 As an example, see Hankir, Y., Rauch, C. and Umber, 
M., Journal of Banking & Finance, 2011. 
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How we link the three areas of research
EOs can have a critical impact on 
merger performance. Ranging from 
personality traits to political ideology, several 
factors can come into play and affect the way a 
manager perceives corporate acquisitions. 
Different types of experience and knowledge as 
well as the degree of company-relatedness can 
also be important drivers of acquisition 
success. With this analysis we link CEO 
experience and diversifying acquisitions, as it is 
our view that in this particular context, industry 
expertise can be a determinant of success for 
the risky and unpredictable unrelated M&A 
endeavors. 
One could expect an industry-expert CEO to 
possess unique skills that can be beneficial for 
shareholders during the negotiation process. 
Additionally, when the CEO is retained 
following the acquisition, they can play a central 
role in the successful integration of the 
combined firm. It is not only the industry 
expertise that matters in such cases but also 
the fact that target CEOs can base their 
reasoning on two different perspectives (the 
bidder and the target’s), which could lead to the 
successful realisation of synergistic gains.  
Surprisingly, the value of target CEO retention 
and their industry expertise has received little 
attention from scholars who have tended to 
focus on the fate of the CEO on the acquiring 
side. 
Our research question therefore focuses on the 
value of the target CEO’s expertise in the 
industry of its acquirer. We attempt to 
determine this value by assessing the effect of 
industry expertise in different stages of the 
merger process. 
 As a first step, we examine the short-term 
market reaction to acquisition 
announcements. We use the reaction of 
the market to the merger as a proxy for the 
                                                          
15 Zhou, Xianming. The Canadian Journal of Economics, 
2000. 
expected synergistic gains. Our focus is on 
distinguishing between cases where the 
target’s CEO possesses industry expertise 
and cases where they don’t.  
 We then examine the acquisition 
negotiation process through analysis of the 
size of premiums paid, the division of 
acquisition gains between the target and 
the bidder and the frequency of bid 
revisions associated with the presence of 
CEOs with and without experience in the 
industry of the acquirer. 
 Finally, we attempt to determine the value 
of the industry expertise of the target’s 
CEO in the integration phase. By looking 
at the long-term operating performance 
and the combined firm cumulative 
abnormal returns, we assess the value of 
the retained industry-expert CEO in 
managing and realising expected 
synergistic gains.  
The key variable of interest in our study is the 
experience of the target company’s CEO in the 
industry of the acquirer. Following other studies 
in the area, we refine this measure of 
experience by only considering top-
management roles as relevant. 15  The reason 
for this is that lower-level roles may not provide 
the opportunity for an individual to gain 
exposure to industry-specific knowledge nor 
gain industry-specific skills. Therefore, the 
considered positions include chief executive 
positions such as Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and Chief 
Operating Officer (COO), Chairman, President, 
top management roles at the divisional level 
and top management roles at the regional level. 
In this way we ensure that our measure of 
experience captures industry-specific skills and 
knowledge of the acquirer’s industry. 
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Our findings 
s a first step towards answering our 
questions we examine the differences in 
terms of post-M&A performance, size of 
premiums and premium revisions 
between the diversifying deals where 
experienced CEOs from the target are retained 
and the cases where these CEOs are let go. 
First, we consider the short-term 
announcement returns around the deals in our 
study. The results are presented in Figure 1. 
The average CAR in our sample of diversifying 
deals is equal to -1.40%. On average, 
diversifying deals are linked to reduced gains 
for the acquirer’s shareholders. This finding is 
in line with the majority of past studies in this 
area and reinforces the idea that lack of 
expertise in the newly-acquired unrelated 
business can be costly for shareholders. 
Interestingly, our analysis also shows that the 
industry expertise of the target’s CEO is 
associated with an average reduction of -2.40% 
in acquirer gains over the three-day window 
surrounding the acquisition announcement. 
Controlling for general managerial skills and 
talent measures does not change our results. In 
our view, this result shows the market will often 
react negatively if the target has a CEO who is 
so experienced he may well choose to leave. 
Figure 1: Analysis of average cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) to acquirer firms 
Type of acquirer CAR 
All diversifying deals -1.40% 
Diversifying deals with 
Experienced CEO from the target 
-2.40% 
Diversifying deals without 
Experienced CEO from the target 
-0.50% 
Source: Cass Business School 
We then look at the average premiums paid in 
our sample of diversifying deals. Figure 2 
shows our results. The averages premium 
across all diversifying deals amounts to 
42.30%. We observe a notable difference in the 
offered premiums between diversifying deals 
with and without experienced CEO from the 
target. Experienced CEOs from the target who 
become part of the acquirer’s management 
team are able to negotiate premiums that 
average to approximately 62%. This value is 
almost twice the average premiums that are 
negotiated between the other companies in our 
sample. These findings show that experienced 
CEOs are able to capture superior value for 
their shareholders through higher negotiated 
premiums. 
Figure 2: Analysis of average premiums 
Type of acquirer Premium 
All diversifying deals 42.30% 
Diversifying deals with 
Experienced CEO from the target 
61.80% 
Diversifying deals without 
Experienced CEO from the target 36.10% 
Source: Cass Business School 
Finally, we examine the average change in the 
three-year ROA of the combined firm in Figure 
3. Retaining experienced CEOs from the target 
firm leads to an average increase in operating 
performance of 7.50% compared to an average 
increase of 4.19% for deals without the 
involvement of experienced CEOs from the 
target.  
Figure 3: Analysis of average change in the three-year ROA 
of the combined firm 
Type of acquirer 3-year ROA 
All diversifying deals 5.00% 
Diversifying deals with 
Experienced CEO from the target 
7.50% 
Diversifying deals without 
Experienced CEO from the target 
4.19% 
Source: Cass Business School 
Multivariate Analysis 
a) Impact on premiums 
To gain a better understanding of the impact of 
industry experience on the size of the premiums 
paid by bidders, we perform multivariate 
analysis. The results are presented in Figure 4. 
We find a positive effect of the industry 
experience of the target’s CEO on takeover 
premiums. The effect is strongly significant and 
amounts to 8.05%, i.e. on average, retaining 
the target’s CEO when they possess industry 
experience leads to 8.05% higher premiums 
compared to other cases. This finding confirms 
that experienced CEOs have better bargaining 
ability.  
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Figure 4: Multivariate analysis of acquisition premiums 
Acquisition premium 
 
Size of 
impact 
Significance 
Diversifying 0.76% No 
Diversifying deals 
with Experienced 
CEO from the target 
8.05% Strong 
Acquirer characteristics included 
Target characteristics included 
Deal characteristics included 
Source: Cass Business School 
b) Impact on relative gains 
The second part of our multivariate analysis 
consists of measuring the effect of industry 
experience on the relative gains of the target 
versus the acquirer. We measure the relative 
gains as the difference in dollar gains which 
accrue to the target and the bidder normalised 
by the combined market capitalisation of the 
two firms as of fifty trading days before the deal 
announcement. We expect that the relative 
target gains will be higher when the CEO from 
the target has experience in the industry of the 
acquirer. The results are presented in Figure 5. 
The association between the industry 
experience of the target’s CEO and the relative 
gains which accrue to the target firm is 
statistically insignificant. While we find that 
experienced CEOs are able to capture more 
value through harder bargaining, we find no link 
with the size of relative gains versus the 
acquirer. 
Figure 5: Multivariate analysis of relative gains 
Variable Relative gains of target to 
bidder 
 Size of 
impact 
Significance 
Diversifying 2.60% Insignificant 
Diversifying deals 
with Experienced 
CEO from the target 
3.64% Insignificant 
Acquirer characteristics included 
Target characteristics included 
Deal characteristics included 
Source: Cass Business School 
c) Impact on price revisions 
After having identified industry experience as a 
determinant for higher premiums, we 
investigate its effect on the merger negotiation 
process in greater depth. If industry experience 
is associated with greater value for the 
shareholders of target firms, we would expect it 
to lead to more favourable negotiated terms for 
the target. Particularly, we want to determine 
whether value is captured through superior 
negotiation skills. To test this, we create a Price 
Revision variable, which we calculate in the 
following way: (final offered price - initial price)/ 
initial price.  
Figure 6 reports the results of the analysis. We 
find that the industry-specific experience of the 
target’s CEO is associated with an average of 
1.74% higher premium revisions compared to a 
value close to 0% for all diversifying 
acquisitions (i.e. the value corresponding to our 
total sample of diversifying deals). This finding 
reinforces the idea that it is the better 
negotiation skills associated with industry 
experience that can partly explain the superior 
premiums received by these targets. 
Figure 6: Multivariate analysis of price revisions 
Variable Price Revision 
Diversifying 0.001% 
Diversifying deals 
with Experienced 
CEO from the target 
1.74% 
Acquirer characteristics included 
Target characteristics included 
Deal characteristics included 
Source: Cass Business School 
Overall, the battery of tests presented above 
indicate that industry experience is driving 
higher premiums and can be beneficial for the 
bargaining position of the target’s CEO and 
their ability to achieve upward offer revisions.  
d) Impact on post-merger integration 
To study the effect of the CEO’s industry 
experience on post-merger integration, we 
restrict our analysis to the cases where the 
CEO from the target is retained by the acquirer 
and is still holding a position within the 
combined firm one year after the completion of 
the deal. We use two different variables to 
capture the relative success of post-merger 
integration.  
First, we estimate synergies by the combined 
firm CAR during the period of three years after 
deal completion. Figure 7 reports the results. 
We find a positive relation between the 
presence of experienced CEO from the target 
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and our proxy for synergies. Although the 
coefficient is not statistically significant, it is 
superior by 1.2 percentage points to the 
performance of retained CEOs from the target 
with no industry expertise. 
Figure 7: Multivariate analysis of long-term CAR 
Variable Long-term CAR 
 
Size of 
impact 
Sig. 
Diversifying deals with 
Experienced CEO from 
the target 
1.20% No 
All diversifying firms 0.001% No 
Acquirer characteristics included 
Target characteristics included 
Deal characteristics included 
Source: Cass Business School 
Second, we measure long-term operating 
performance by the change of the combined 
firm’s return on assets (ROA) three years after 
the deal completion compared to the weighted 
average ROA of the acquirer and the target one 
year before the deal announcement. The 
results are presented in Figure 8. 
Figure 8: Multivariate analysis of long-term operating 
performance 
Variable Change in three-year 
ROA 
 Size of 
impact 
Sig. 
Diversifying deals with 
Experienced CEO from the 
target 
3.80% Weak 
All diversifying firms 0.30% Weak 
Acquirer characteristics included 
Target characteristics included 
Deal characteristics included 
Source: Cass Business School 
We find a positive and statistically significant 
effect of industry experience on the long-term 
operating performance of the combined firm. 
The average operating performance for the 
firms where experienced CEOs are retained is 
3.8% higher than cases where the CEOs are 
without such experience. Our results indicate 
that CEOs with industry experience are able to 
create superior value by having a positive effect 
on the profitability of the combined firm.  
We note that one related study finds a negative 
association between industry experience on the 
acquiring side and profitability based on an 
analysis of 1,675 acquisitions. 16  The positive 
impact of industry experience coming from the 
target’s side which we observe could be 
explained by the fact that these CEOs are better 
at implementing change in the combined 
organisation. Several studies suggest that the 
perceived superiority of the acquirer can lead to 
defensiveness and resistance to change in the 
target firm.17 However, experienced CEOs from 
the target firm could be better at encouraging 
such change through their understanding of the 
different organisational cultures and 
management style across the two industries of 
the target and the bidder. For example, the 
integration process could be facilitated by 
convincing target employees of the need of 
change and communicating the rationale for 
such change in accordance with the target-
specific organisational culture. As a result, 
experienced CEOs can be better able to 
mitigate some of the pitfalls of merger 
integration by facilitating the transfer of 
knowledge in the combined firm. 
Overall, the analysis presented above is 
consistent with the view that target firms’ CEOs 
with experience in the industry of the acquirer 
have the advantage of specilised knowledge of 
“both worlds”, i.e. the industries of the target 
and bidder firms. This expert knowledge 
provides them with a much more intricate 
understanding of the differences between the 
two industries. Such knowledge might be 
crucial in negotiating better terms for 
shareholders as well as developing successful 
integration strategies.
                                                          
16 Custodió, C. and Metzger, D., Working Paper, 2013. 17 Haspeslagh, P. and Jemison, D., Journal of International 
Management, 1991. 
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Conclusions and implications  
his report demonstrates significant 
implications on the central role of 
industry experience at the management 
level in the acquisition negotiation and 
integration phase. We find that CEOs with 
industry experience are better bargainers than 
other CEOs without such experience. 
Moreover, industry experience appears to be 
particularly beneficial in facilitating learning and 
knowledge transfer between the newly merged 
firms. In particular, we provide evidence of the 
benefit of retaining managers with industry 
experience on the realisation of the potential 
synergies of the acquisition. 
This research provides evidence of the 
importance of industry experience in terms of its 
impact on announcement returns, bargaining 
power and post-M&A operating performance. 
We demonstrate that industry experience can 
exert a material impact on the degree of M&A 
success from the perspective of the 
shareholders of both the bidder and target. 
Specifically, we show that industry experience 
can be particularly important in diversifying 
acquisitions where the experienced CEOs can 
deploy their superior bargaining skills to capture 
higher acquisition premiums and higher price 
revisions. Our results also indicate that CEOs 
with industry experience are able to create 
superior value through more efficient post-
merger integration.  
While we find statistically significant evidence 
relating to our key research question, it is our 
view that the analysis presented in this report 
could be extended by performing similar tests 
but on the basis of an acquisition sample which 
consists of smaller deals. Additionally, the 
inclusion of acquisitions of private targets could 
provide interesting insights relating to additional 
factors that may affect the degree to which 
industry experience can contribute to value 
generation from acquisitions. Private targets 
may be associated with lower availability of 
information which could make the industry 
experience of their CEOs even more relevant.  
Lessons learnt 
We demonstrate that working in the industry of 
the target and bidder can expand 
management’s knowledge relating to how to 
best combine resources and capabilities from 
the two. This is particularly the case when the 
two industries are not related. Such knowledge 
can relate to better understanding of the 
competitive environment, suppliers, customers, 
dominant cultures and management styles of 
these different industries. In addition to being a 
source of superior bargaining ability, such 
knowledge can provide the advantage of 
facilitating the post-merger integration process. 
As a result, our findings show that acquirers in 
unrelated industries need to take particular care 
of the management and transfer of industry-
specific knowledge within the newly combined 
firm. The industry experience and knowledge 
can be used by acquirers to prevent culture 
clashes and, more broadly, any kind of tension 
that could arise between the acquiring firm’s 
employees and the retained staff from the 
target.  
Additional implications 
Overall, our research adds to the existing body 
of knowledge on the role of the CEO in the 
acquisition process and particularly on the 
value of industry expertise in the integration 
phase of M&A. Our findings also speak to the 
existing debate of generalist versus specialist 
management skills by suggesting that, in some 
situations, industry-specific knowledge coming 
from the target company’s management can be 
instrumental in the development and retention 
of new competitive advantages.  
T 
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Appendix
Deal sample and variables 
We start with a sample of 985 deals, which we further restrict to include only deals that are diversifying. 
We classify a given deal as diversifying if the acquirer and the target differ in their Fama French 12-
Industries (FF12) classification. The code provided by Van Alfen (2017) allows the conversion of the 
companies’ Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes to their corresponding FF12 industry 
classification. The FF12 classification allows us to ensure that the industries of the target and the bidder 
are unrelated and distinctive in nature. This yields 195 diversifying deals. Deals without the necessary 
CEO data are removed from our sample. The sample of M&A transactions comes from the Securities 
Data Company’s (SDC) US Mergers and Acquisitions database. It consists of all announced deals 
between 2005 and 2015 and involves acquisitions of U.S targets by U.S bidders. The sample 
construction procedure is consistent with that in Custodió and Metzger (2013) who apply the following 
criteria: (1) spinoffs, recapitalisations, repurchases, exchange offers, privatizations self-tenders and 
acquisitions of remaining or partial interest, are excluded; (2) the deal must represent a transfer of 
control, meaning that the share of the acquirer before the deal must be below 50%, and increase above 
50% after the transaction is completed; (3) the value of the deal must be at least $50 million; (4) stock 
and accounting information must be available from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
and Compustat for both the acquiring and target firms. This procedure yields a sample of 170 deals. 
To determine the value created from acquisitions and the market reaction to acquisition 
announcements, we measure the abnormal announcement returns which accrue to the acquirer 
company’s shareholders. To calculate the cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) we use the event study 
methodology. The acquirer companies’ CAR are measured over a three-day window around the 
announcement of the merger and adjusted to the S&P 500 index. We capture the realisation of 
synergistic gains by examining the three-year industry-adjusted ROA of the combined firm. We also 
adopt a short-term measure of the synergistic gains associated with the acquisition calculated as the 
CARs of the combined firm over a three-day window surrounding the acquisition announcement. The 
combined CAR are weighted by the market capitalisations of the target and the bidder as of 40 days 
prior to deal announcement. 
The negotiation phase of the acquisition is examined through the analysis of the final offer premium 
(variable name Acquisition Premium) and the target’s gains relative to the gains of the acquirer (variable 
name Relative Gains). The Acquisition Premium is calculated by dividing the offer price by the target’s 
stock price as of four weeks before the M&A announcement date. The Relative Gains are calculated as 
in Ahern (2012) and represent the relative gain of the target compared to the acquirer for each dollar of 
total market value. Specifically, to measure the Relative Gains we use the following formula: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑥 𝑀𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 –  𝐶𝐴𝑅 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑥 𝑀𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟
𝑀𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 +  𝑀𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟
 
where MV is the market capitalisation as of 50 days prior to deal announcement. 
Figure 9 presents the distribution of our sample of deals over time. We notice that the percentage of 
diversifying deals remains relatively stable throughout the years and averages around 20% the total 
sample. Figure 10, reports the distribution of our sample per industry. The majority of firms constituting 
our sample come from the business equipment and finance industries. We can see that the level of 
diversification of companies from the non-durable, healthcare and manufacturing sectors is quite low.  
Figure 11 reports the average values for our main variables where the sample is divided into two groups 
which are determined on the basis of the industry experience of the target firm’s CEO. We can see that 
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CEO characteristics are similar across the two groups. Regarding the characteristics of the acquiring 
firms, CEOs with industry experience tend to deal with larger acquirers. This could be explained by the 
fact that CEOs with industry experience tend to work for larger targets. In addition, CEOs with industry 
experience tend to work for targets with higher previous M&A experience. Indeed, the average number 
of acquisitions completed by the firms managed by CEOs with industry experience in the previous three 
years averages 0.25, nearly twice as much as CEOs with no industry experience. The latter statistic 
shows the need to control for the firm’s M&A experience as it may be correlated with the value of 
industry-expertise. 
Figure 9: Descriptive Statistics of deals according to major division of operations 
Year Deals Diversifying 
Percentage 
Diversifying 
Non-
diversifying 
Percentage 
Non-
diversifying 
2005 110 13 12% 97 88% 
2006 132 25 19% 107 81% 
2007 115 22 19% 93 81% 
2008 81 12 15% 69 85% 
2009 59 12 20% 47 80% 
2010 77 16 21% 61 79% 
2011 54 9 17% 45 83% 
2012 71 13 18% 58 82% 
2013 73 8 11% 65 89% 
2014 97 17 18% 80 82% 
2015 116 23 20% 93 80% 
Full sample 985 170 17% 815 83% 
Source: Cass Business School 
Figure 10: Descriptive Statistics of deals according to major division of operations 
Fama-French Industry 
Category Deals Diversifying 
Percentage 
Diversifying 
Non-
diversifying 
Percentage 
Non-
diversifying 
Consumer 
nondurables 
22 1 5% 21 95% 
Consumer durables 13 8 62% 5 38% 
Manufacturing 68 29 43% 39 57% 
Energy 34 5 15% 29 85% 
Chemical products 20 9 45% 11 55% 
Business equipment 253 39 15% 214 85% 
Telecom 50 15 30% 35 70% 
Utilities 32 5 16% 27 84% 
Wholesale and retail 58 13 22% 45 78% 
Healthcare 127 11 9% 116 91% 
Finance 243 14 6% 229 94% 
Other 65 21 32% 44 68% 
Full sample 985 170 17% 815 83% 
Source: Cass Business School 
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Figure 11: Descriptive Statistics of deals according to major division of operations 
 
Full 
sample 
Industry 
Experience 
No industry 
experience 
Panel A: CEO-related characteristics 
Finance experience 0.19 0.15 0.2 
Ivy League 0.23 0.17 0. 24 
Number of companies 2.55 2.5 2.54 
Number of industries 2.51 2.4 2.49 
Tenure 10.27 10.3 10.2 
Cases where the target’s CEO is 
retained 
0.32 0.4 0.3 
Panel B: Acquirer characteristics 
Acquirer size 52087 63148 48684 
Operational cash flow 0.10 0.11 0.10 
Acquirer’s growth opportunities 1.95 2.3 1.8 
Acquirer leverage 0.35 0.34 0.35 
ROA 0.14 0.15 0.14 
Number of past deals 0.53 0.61 0.5 
Panel C:Target characteristics 
Target size 3232 4659 2792 
Operational cash flow 0.05 -0.01 0.07 
Target’s  g row th opportuni t i es  1.86 2.04 1.8 
ROA 0.12 0.09 0.13 
Number of past deals 0.17 0.25 0.14 
Panel C: Deal characteristics 
All cash deal 0.55 0.6 0.56 
Stock deal 0.11 0.02 0.10 
Deals with competing bidders 0.07 0.07 0.06 
Relative deal size 0.44 0.34 0.46 
Deal value 1925.09 2360.15 1652.14 
Source: Cass Business School 
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